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Introduction
In 2011, WorldNetDaily.com and its CEO, Joseph Farah, posted
more than sixty “internet items” and forty-seven articles questioning
the validity of President Barak Obama’s birth certificate.1 Following
the release of the President’s long-form birth certificate, Farah and his
company fanned the flames by advertising WolrdNetDaily.com’s
upcoming publication of a book by Dr. Jerome Corsi entitled, “Where’s
the Birth Certificate? The Case That Barak Obama Is Not Eligible to
Be President.”2 Following the book’s release, Esquire Magazine poked
fun at the book and satirically claimed that Farah changed his mind
because publishing the book would make him and his company look
like “idiots.”3 Farah, not finding the humor in the matter, sued Esquire
Magazine for “more than $100 million in actual and compensatory
damages and more than $20 million in punitive damages,” alleging,
among other claims, defamation.4 Esquire responded by moving to
dismiss Farah’s claim under the District of Columbia’s anti-SLAPP
law.5
The District Court for the District of Columbia applied the antiSLAPP statute without question6 and only inquired whether Esquire
Magazine’s blog post was protected speech under the statute.7
Ultimately, the court concluded that Esquire’s comments were the type
of speech protected under the anti-SLAPP act and dismissed Farah’s
complaint.8
However, the court noted that “the rationale that applie[d] to the
motion . . . under the D.C. [a]nti-SLAPP Act also applie[d] to
Defendants’ motion to dismiss [for] failure to state a claim.”9 While the
rationale for Rule 12(b)(6) and the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss may
1.

Farah v. Esquire Magazine, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 29, 32 (D.D.C. 2012).

2.

Id. at 31.

3.

See id. at 33–34 (placing a blog post next to a picture of the Corsi book
claiming that Farah said, among other things, “‘I mean, we’ll do anything
to hurt Obama, and erase his memory, but we don’t want to look like
[idiots].”).

4.

Id. at 34–35.

5.

Id. at 31, 35.

6.

See id. at 35–39 (addressing only the merits of Esquire Magazine’s claims
under the District of Columbia’s anti-SLAPP statute). See generally D.C.
Code § 16-5501 (LexisNexis 2012) (allowing individuals to file a special
motion to dismiss when a SLAPP lawsuit has been brought against them
based on their statements about matters of public concern).

7.

Farah, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 38.

8.

Id. at 39.

9.

Id.
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have been similar, there are important differences between the two.
Namely, the anti-SLAPP motion imposes a different burden of proof on
both the defendant and the plaintiff.10 Furthermore, a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion considers the pleadings alone, whereas an anti-SLAPP motion
allows a court to examine affidavits apart from the pleadings. This
should have raised a red flag for the court to perform a conflict of law
analysis to determine whether the anti-SLAPP statute motion to
dismiss or Rule 12(b)(6) was appropriate. After all, presenting evidence
and the burden of proof are important procedural rights.11
Unfortunately, the district court did not perform a conflict of law
analysis. The court considered the anti-SLAPP statute’s applicability
in federal court as an afterthought, dismissing any conflict of law
analysis in a footnote.12 This could be taken as an indication that antiSLAPP statutes are consistently applied by federal courts sitting in
diversity; however, that is not the case. In fact, just four months before
the decision in Farah, the same district court refused to apply the exact
same anti-SLAPP statute due to a conflict with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in 3M Company v. Boulter.13
Much like in Farah, the plaintiff in 3M alleged the defendant
engaged in a “campaign of harassment,” and the defendant, Boulter,
responded that the plaintiff’s lawsuit was frivolous.14 The district court
in 3M resolved the issue by following the conflict of law analysis
adopted by the Supreme Court’s plurality in Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates v. Allstate Insurance Company.15 The 3M court concluded
that the District of Columbia’s anti-SLAPP statute impermissibly
conflicted with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56 and,
therefore, did not apply in federal court.16 What is even more interesting
10.

See D.C. Code § 16-5503(b) (LexisNexis 2012) (“If a person bringing a
special motion to quash under this section makes a prima facie showing
that the underlying claim arises from an act in furtherance of the right of
advocacy on issues of public interest, then the motion shall be granted
unless the party seeking his or her personal identifying information
demonstrates that the underlying claim is likely to succeed on the merits,
in which case the motion shall be denied.”).

11.

Tackett v. M & G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d 478, 487 (6th Cir. 2009).

12.

Farah, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 36 n.10.

13.

842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 93 (D.D.C. 2012). Compare 3M, which was decided
on February 2, 2012, with Farah, which was decided on June 4, 2012
(demonstrating federal courts’ confusion over whether to apply antiSLAPP laws).

14.

See 3M, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 89–92, 102.

15.

130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010).

16.

See 3M, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 101–07 (applying the analysis in Shady Grove
to find a direct conflict and determining that the state statute could not
apply in federal court).
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is that the defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss was subsequently
denied by the district court.17 The same motion to dismiss was not
applied in Farah because the defamation claim was meritless under the
District of Columbia’s anti-SLAPP statute.18 Unlike Farah, the court
in 3M found not only that the plaintiff’s claim had merit, but also that
the plaintiff had actually stated a claim for which relief could be
granted. However, if the plaintiff’s claim in 3M had been considered
under the anti-SLAPP statute, the motion would have been subject to
a higher burden of proof and litigated with less evidence, likely resulting
in the dismissal of the claim.
These conflicting opinions reflect the confusion of federal courts in
determining whether anti-SLAPP statutes apply in federal court. In
this context, the importance of Shady Grove, the most recent progeny
of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,19 cannot be underestimated. The
plurality in Shady Grove gave the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
increased prominence over a possibly conflicting state law. This Note
seeks to identify and resolve the confusion that has perplexed federal
courts when deciding whether anti-SLAPP statutes are preempted by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Ultimately, because Shady
Grove’s plurality should be applied, anti-SLAPP statutes cannot apply
in federal court as they conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Moreover, the conflict between the anti-SLAPP statute and
federal rules is critical. Anti-SLAPP statutes require that in order to
defeat a motion, a plaintiff satisfy a heightened standard of proof while
simultaneously depriving the plaintiff of evidence available to meet that
standard.
Part I of this Note will discuss the problems that led to anti-SLAPP
statutes and evaluates their purpose and how they function. Part II of
this Note will examine the evolution of conflict of law analysis under
Erie, what role Shady Grove’s plurality plays in that analysis, and how
it has been applied by federal courts. Lastly, Part III observes what
happens when federal courts follow the plurality in Shady Grove; antiSLAPP statutes cannot apply in federal court because they directly
conflict with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(d) and 56.

I.

What Is an “Anti-SLAPP” Law?

This section gives some general insight into the purpose and
function of anti-SLAPP laws before discussing the legal complexities
surrounding their application in federal courts. First, this section looks
at what a SLAPP is. Second, this section discusses how anti-SLAPP
17.

Id. at 117.

18.

Id. See also Farah v. Esquire Magazine, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 29, 32
(D.D.C. 2012).

19.

304 U.S. 64 (1937).
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statutes solve that problem. Identifying the purpose and functions of
anti-SLAPP statutes make the reasons why they may not apply in
federal court evident.
A.

The Problems That Created Anti-SLAPP Laws

A SLAPP is a “strategic lawsuit against public participation.”20 In
a SLAPP, the plaintiff typically sues “without substantial merit . . . to
‘stop citizens from exercising their political rights or to punish them for
having done so.’”21 The plaintiff’s goal is not win the lawsuit but to
“foist[] upon the target the expenses of a defense.”22 The plaintiff does
this by first filing a complaint or counterclaim against a party because
of their communication to the general public on an issue that involves
public interest.23 The plaintiffs in SLAPPs rarely win in court but
instead achieve their purpose by leaving the defendants “devastated
and depoliticized”24 and “chilling” the defendant’s constitutional rights
to freedom of speech and petition.25 For the plaintiff, it is a simple costbenefit analysis: the plaintiff can easily shoulder the cost of litigation
and highly values an opportunity to silence the defendant; the
defendant cannot easily bear the cost of litigation, so the threat of any
suit is enough to deter her.26
In response to the “disturbing increase” in SLAPPs, many state
legislatures passed laws to “encourage continued participation in matters of public significance” and stop the “abuse of the judicial process.”27
These became known as anti-SLAPP statutes, and to date, twentyeight states, the District of Columbia, and Guam have them.28 AntiSLAPP statutes give defendants an opportunity to dispose of litigation

20.

George Pring first coined the term “SLAPP.” See George W. Pring,
SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 7 Pace Envtl.
L. Rev. 3, 3 (1989).

21.

Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649, 656 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (quoting
Pring, supra note 20, at 5–6).

22.

Id.

23.

Pring, supra note 20, at 8.

24.

Id.

25.

See id. at 9; Intercon Solutions, Inc. v. Basel Action Network, 969 F.
Supp. 2d 1026, 1033 (N.D. Ill. 2013).

26.

For a thorough discussion on the financial, emotional, and personal effects
of SLAPPs on defendants, see George W. Pring & Penelope Canan,
SLAPPs: Getting Sued for Speaking Out 1–8 (1996).

27.

La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 971(2) (2005).

28.

See State Anti-SLAPP Laws, Pub. Participation Project,
http://www.anti-slapp.org/your-states-free-speech-protection/ (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) (listing every state and territory with anti-SLAPP
legislation).
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before it even starts by “screen[ing] meritless claims pursued to chill
one’s constitutional rights under the First Amendment.”29
B.

How an Anti-SLAPP Law Works

Although anti-SLAPP statutes are not exactly the same in every
state, they do share characteristics that make them easy to identify.30
In particular, anti-SLAPP statutes invariably protect the rights of
litigants by creating a motion to dismiss a frivolous claim early in
litigation. As discussed in this section, the anti-SLAPP statute protects
those rights by (1) conferring immunity to the anti-SLAPP plaintiff
under the First Amendment, (2) providing that immunity through a
motion to dismiss the anti-SLAPP defendant’s claim, and (3) shifting
the burden to the anti-SLAPP defendant to show that her lawsuit is
not frivolous. Federal courts determining whether federal rules preempt
anti-SLAPP statutes have focused on all three aspects.
Anti-SLAPP statutes aim to protect a defendant’s rights under the
First Amendment to petition and speak out for a public purpose.31 The
idea behind anti-SLAPP regimes is to allow a defendant to dismiss a
case and become entirely immune from litigating the claim.32 This
permits would-be defendants to “continue[] participation in matters of
29.

Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, LLC, 566 F.3d 164, 169 (5th Cir. 2009).

30.

In fact, some are given away by their title. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 12-752 (2013) (“Strategic lawsuits against public participation;
motion to dismiss”); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8136 (2013) (“Actions
involving public petition and participation”); Md. Code Ann. Cts. &
Jud. Proc. § 5-807 (LexisNexis 2013) (“Strategic lawsuits against public
participation”).

31.

See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code. § 425.16(e)(4) (West 2013) (protecting
“other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of
petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest”). See also Kathryn W. Tate,
California’s Anti-SLAPP Legislation: A Summary of and Commentary
on Its Operation and Scope, 33 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 801, 832 (2000)
(describing the purpose of California’s anti-SLAPP regime). When
referring to SLAPP litigation, this Note uses the term “defendant” and
“plaintiff” to mean a SLAPP plaintiff and a SLAPP defendant,
respectively. These are not always the typical plaintiff or defendant, as
an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss can be filed by the plaintiff in response
to a counterclaim by the defendant.

32.

See Henry, 566 F.3d at 177; Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 85 (1st Cir.
2012) (explaining that “[t]here is a ‘crucial distinction between a right not
to be tried and a right whose remedy requires dismissal of charges’” and
finding that anti-SLAPP laws create a right not to be tried) (quoting
Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 801 (1989)). See
also Katelyn E. Saner, Getting SLAPP-ed in Federal Court: Applying
State Anti-SLAPP Special Motions to Dismiss in Federal Court After
Shady Grove, 63 Duke L.J. 781, 791 (2013) (“States enact anti-SLAPP
laws with the goals of shielding defendants from litigating against
meritless claims and encouraging protected speech.”).
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public significance” by preventing the chilling effect of SLAPPs.33 The
anti-SLAPP statute typically embodies these goals in the text of the
statute itself, including legislative findings or the purpose of the
statute.34 The inclusion of an anti-SLAPP statute’s purpose in the text
of the statute itself has had a significant influence on federal courts
reviewing the statute’s applicability.35
Anti-SLAPP statutes achieve immunity for defendants by allowing
them to file a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s claim early on in the
litigation.36 Consequently, the aims of an anti-SLAPP statute are
accomplished almost entirely through procedure. The motion involves
a burden-shifting scheme, a timing deadline, parameters on what
information can be considered, and a determination of litigation expenses. The motion itself is typically characterized as a “motion for
summary judgment,” “special motion to strike,” “motion to dismiss,”
or “judgment on the pleadings.”37 Some anti-SLAPP statutes avoid
33.

Henry, 566 F.3d at 169.

34.

See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.2 (2013) (“The legislature declares
that it is the public policy of New Mexico to protect the rights of its
citizens to participate in quasijudicial proceedings before local and state
governmental tribunals.”); Ind. Cod Ann. § 34-7-7-1(a) (West 2013)
(“This chapter applies to an act in furtherance of a person’s right of
petition or free speech under the Constitution of the United States or the
Constitution of Indiana in connection with a public issue or an issue of
public interest.”).

35.

See, e.g., Henry, 566 F.3d at 170; Godin, 629 F.3d at 82; U.S. ex rel.
Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963, 970–71 (9th
Cir. 1999).

36.

See Godin, 629 F.3d at 85 (finding that anti-SLAPP laws grant the
defendant the “right not to be tried,” not a “remedy [that] requires the
dismissal of charges”). See generally Pring & Canan, supra note 26, at
143–67 (recommending a prevention strategy as the means by which the
judiciary systems should manage SLAPPs).

37.

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-752(A) (2013) (“[T]he defending party
may file a motion to dismiss the action under this section.”); Ark. Code
Ann. § 16-63-507(a)(1) (West 2013) (allowing special discovery “upon
the filing of a motion to dismiss or a motion to strike under § 16-63506”); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1) (West Supp. 2014) (declaring frivolous claims “shall be subject to a special motion to strike”);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8137 (2013) (allowing SLAPP defendants to
file “[a] motion to dismiss”); D.C. Code § 16-5502(a) (LexisNexis 2013)
(describing the circumstances in which “[a] party may file a special
motion to dismiss”); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.295(5) (West 2013) (“A
person or entity may petition the court for an order dismissing the
action or granting final judgment in favor of that person or entity.”);
Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-11.1(d) (2014) (allowing special discovery “upon
the filing of a motion to dismiss or a motion to strike made pursuant to
subsection (b) of this Code section”); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634F-2 (West
2013) (“The motion shall be treated as a motion for judgment on the
pleadings.”); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 110/10 (West 2013)
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using such language and instead merely entitle the defendant to
immunity, even though the defendant needs to file a motion to assert
that immunity.38 In doing so, such motions track, at least in name,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56.
(“‘Motion’ includes any motion to dismiss, for summary judgment, or
to strike, or any other judicial pleading filed to dispose of a judicial
claim.”); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-7-7-9(a)(1) (West 2011) (“If a person
files a motion to dismiss under this chapter, the court in which the
motion is flied shall . . . [t]reat the motion as a motion for summary
judgment.”); La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 971(A)(1) (Supp. 2015)
(declaring that frivolous claims “shall be subject to a special motion to
strike”); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 556 (2013) (being subject to a
frivolous lawsuit, “the moving party may bring a special motion to
dismiss”); Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-807(d) (West 2013)
(granting SLAPP defendants permission to file a “[m]otion to dismiss or
stay proceedings”); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, § 59H (West 2000)
(being the case that some parties to litigation are harassed by meritless
claims, “said party may bring a special motion to dismiss”); Minn.
Stat. Ann. § 554.01(4) (West 2010) (“‘Motion’ includes any motion to
dismiss, motion for summary judgment, or any other judicial pleading
filed to dispose of a judicial claim.”); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.528(1)
(2013) (“[A SLAPP plaintiff’s claim] is subject to a special motion to
dismiss, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or motion for summary
that shall be considered by the court on a priority or expedited basis to
ensure the early consideration of the issues raised by the motion.”); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 25-21,245 (2009) (“A motion to dismiss based on a failure
to state a cause of action shall be granted.”); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 41.660(3)(a) (2013) (“If a special motion to dismiss is filed pursuant
to a subsection 2, the court shall: Treat the motion as a motion for
summary judgment . . . .”); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(A) (West
2010) (“[a SLAPP claim shall be] subject to a special motion to dismiss,
motion for judgment on the pleadings, or motion summary judgment”);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g) (McKinney Supp. 2014) (granting a motion to
dismiss and referencing N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §70-a (McKinney 2009),
which is the anti-SLAPP statute for New York); Or. Rev. Stat. §
31.150(1) (2013) (“A defendant may make a special motion to strike
against a claim . . . treated as a motion to dismiss.”); Tex. Civ. Prac.
& Rem. Code Ann. § 27.003(a) (West Supp. 2014) (allowing a party
to “file a motion to dismiss the legal action” if it is meritless); Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-6-1403(1)(b) (West 2009) (permitting a party who is
subject to a SLAPP to make “a motion for judgment on the pleadings”);
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1041(a) (Supp. 2013) (“A defendant . . . may
file a special motion to strike under this section.”); Wash. Rev. Code
§ 4.24.525(4)(b) (Supp. 2013) (“A moving party bringing a special
motion to strike a claim under this subsection.”).
38.

See 27 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8303 (West 2009) (“A person who
wishes to raise the defense of immunity from civil liability under this
chapter may file a motion with the court requesting the court to conduct
a hearing to determine the preliminary issue of immunity.”); R.I. Gen.
Laws. Ann. § 9-33-2(c) (West 2013) (“The immunity established by
this section may be asserted by an appropriate motion or by other
appropriate means under the applicable rules of civil procedure.”);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-1003(a) (2011) (“Any person who in
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This motion to dismiss must be filed in a very specific amount of
time. In some jurisdictions, like Arkansas, if the special motion to
dismiss is not filed contemporaneously with the pleading, the ability to
file an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss is waived.39 On the other hand,
Arizona allows a defendant up to ninety days, or any other time the
court thinks is prudent after receiving the complaint, to file a special
motion to dismiss.40 Ideally, this serves to protect the defendant from
litigating meritless claims in which she would incur a great deal of
expenses.41 Such an expedited motion also creates an issue over what
information a court may consider and what the burden of proof will be.
This is true especially since the motion to dismiss requires some inquiry
into the merits of the claim.
When a defendant files a motion under an anti-SLAPP statute, the
plaintiff’s complaint is dismissed “unless the court determines that the
plaintiff has established that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”42
Usually, the defendant’s initial burden in filing the special motion to
dismiss is only a “prima facie” showing that the suite “arises from any
act by the citizen party ‘in furtherance of the person’s right of petition
or free speech . . . in connection with a public issue.’”43 In evaluating
whether the defendant satisfies this burden, the court considers the
pleadings and affidavits supporting the contentions of the opposing

furtherance of such person’s right of free speech or petition under the
Tennessee or United States Constitution in connection with a public or
governmental issue communicates information regarding another person
or entity to any agency of the federal, state or local government
regarding a matter of concern to that agency shall be immune from civil
liability on claims based upon the communication to the agency.”).
Oklahoma’s defamation statute excludes the types of communications
protected by anti-SLAPP statutes from the types of communications
that would subject a person to liability. A defendant needs to use a
motion to assert this liability; a plaintiff needs to prove that the alleged
communication by defendant is not included in specified, protected
communication. See Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 14431.1 (2013) (defining a
privileged communication).
39.

See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-63-505 (West 2013).

40.

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-752(C) (Supp. 2013).

41.

See, e.g., N.M. Stat. Ann. § 38-2-9.1(A) (West 2010) (requiring courts
considering anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss “on a priority or expedited
basis to ensure the early consideration of the issues raised by the motion
and to prevent the unnecessary expense of litigation”). See also Pring &
Canan, supra note 26, at 26 (describing the most effective means of
managing SLAPPs and protecting defendants).

42.

Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1) (West Supp. 2014).

43.

U.S. ex rel. Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 190 F.3d 963,
971 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(1)).
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sides.44 Alternatively, some jurisdictions allow for special discovery and
a hearing on the motion.45 Considering such information in addition to
44.

See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-752(B) (Supp. 2013) (“In making its
determination, the court shall consider the pleadings and supporting and
opposing affidavits stating facts on which the liability or defense is
based.”); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(b)(2) (West Supp. 2014) (“In
making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings, and
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the
liability or defense is based.”); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 720.304(4)(c) (West
2013) (“The petitioner may file a motion for summary judgment, together
with supplemental affidavits, seeking a determination that the
governmental entity’s, business organization’s, or individual’s lawsuit has
been brought in violation of this section.”); Haw. Rev. Stat. § 634F2(4)(A) (West 2013) (“Without leave of court, have seven days to amend
its pleadings to be pled with specificity, and shall include such supporting
particulars as are peculiarly within the supporting pleader’s knowledge”);
Ind. Code Ann. § 34-7-7-9(c) (2011) (“The court shall make its
determination based on the facts contained in the pleadings and affidavits
filed and discovered under the expedited proceeding.”); La. Code Civ.
Proc. Ann. art. 971(A)(2) (Supp. 2015) (“In making its determination,
the court shall consider the pleadings and supporting and opposing
affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.”);
Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 556 (2013) (“In making its determination, the
court shall consider the pleading and supporting and opposing affidavits
stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.”); Mass.
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 231, § 59H (West 2000) (“In making its
determination, the court shall consider the pleadings and supporting and
opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the liability or defense is
based.”); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g) (McKinney Supp. 2014) (requiring
adequate evidence to be submitted to the court, including affidavits); Or.
Rev. Stat. § 31.150(4) (2013) (“In making a determination under
subsection (1) of this section, the court shall consider pleadings and
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the
liability or defense is based.”); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §
27.006(a) (West Supp. 2014) (“In determining whether a legal action
should be dismissed under this chapter, the court shall consider the
pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts on
which the liability or defense is based.”); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-61403(1)(a) (West 2009) (allowing the defendant to file affidavits “detailing
his belief that the action is designed” to chill his right to public
participation); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 1041(e)(2) (Supp. 2013) (“In
making its determination, the court shall consider the pleadings and
supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon which the
liability or defense is based.”); Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.525(4)(c) (Supp.
2013) (“In making a determination under (b) of this subsection, the court
shall consider pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating
the facts upon which the liability or defense is based.”).

45.

See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-63-507(a)(2)–(b) (West 2013) (requiring a
hearing and allowing discovery for purposes of that hearing if necessary);
D.C. Code §§ 16-5502(c)(1), (d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014) (permitting
special discovery where not doing so would be “unduly burdensome” and
allowing “expedited hearing[s]”); Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-11.1(d) (West
2014) (granting special discovery or hearings); 735 Ill. Comp. Stat.
Ann. 110/20(a)–(b) (West 2013) (during suspended discovery there may
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the pleadings mimics Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d).46 In any
event, if the defendant satisfies the initial burden required by the antiSLAPP motion to dismiss, the plaintiff must then establish by a
“reasonable probability” that she will prevail on the merits.47 Typically,
the prevailing party obtains attorney’s fees and any costs incurred in
filling or responding to the special motion to strike.48 The problem in
federal courts is that, as observed above, some provisions in the antiSLAPP statutes resemble provisions of federal rules, and there is long
history of barring the application of such state laws in federal courts.

II. Feeling the Tension Between the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and State Laws
As already observed, anti-SLAPP laws provide important
protection for litigants who do not have the means to defend themselves
against frivolous law suits and deter plaintiffs from wasting judicial
resources. What makes anti-SLAPP statutes so unique is they are
simultaneously substantive and procedural. The trouble is that there is

be hearings and special discovery); Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc.
§ 5-807(d)(1) (West 2013) (requiring a court to hold a hearing on the
motion as soon as possible); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 554.02 Subd. 2(1) (West
2010) (permitting special discovery if good cause is shown); Mo. Rev.
Stat. § 537.528(1) (2013) (subjecting a claim “to a special motion to
dismiss, motion for judgment on the pleadings, or motion for summary
that shall be considered by the court on a priority or expedited basis to
ensure the early consideration of the issues raised by the motion”); Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 25-21,245 (2013) (“The court shall expedite and grant
preference in the hearing of such motion.”); 27 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §
8303 (West 2009) (requiring a hearing following the motion); R.I. Gen.
Laws Ann. § 9-33-2(b) (West 2013) (allowing for special discovery and
hearing for “good cause”).
46.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c),
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the
court, the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under
Rule 56. All parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all
the material that is pertinent to the motion.”).

47.

Newsham, 190 F.3d at 971.

48.

See e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(c)(2) (West Supp. 2014) (“A
defendant who prevails on a special motion to strike in an action subject
to paragraph (1) shall not be entitled to attorney’s fees and costs if that
cause of action . . . .”); D.C. Code § 16-5504(b) (LexisNexis Supp. 2014)
(“The court may award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the
responding party only if the court finds that a motion brought under § 165502 or § 16-5503 is frivolous or is solely intended to cause unnecessary
delay.”); Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1405(a)–(b) (West 2013) (awarding
“reasonable attorney fees” and “other compensatory damages” upon a
success anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss).
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a federal doctrine, the Erie Doctrine, according to which “state substantive law and federal procedural law apply in diversity cases.”49 Determining when to apply state substantive law and federal procedural law
has created problems for federal courts since Erie’s inception.50 This
doctrine and the bifurcated nature of anti-SLAPP statutes has
prevented federal courts from coming to a consensus on whether antiSLAPP statutes apply in federal diversity cases. In order to understand
some of these complexities, this Note first explores the evolution of the
Erie doctrine and its progeny, culminating in Shady Grove.
A.

What Shady Grove Actually Contributed and
Took Away from the Erie Doctrine

Contrary to the opinion of some scholars,51 Shady Grove’s plurality
announced a workable and consistent modification to conflict of law
analysis under the Rules Enabling Act (REA).52 When a federal court
is evaluating a state law that seems to conflict with that federal rule,
there are two potential steps to the analysis. The first step is an analysis
of the state law under the REA, and depending on the outcome of that
analysis, the second step is an evaluation of the law under the Rules of
Decision Act (RDA).53 This Note focuses on REA analysis, as this was
the center of the discussion in Shady Grove. Since Justice Scalia’s
plurality in Shady Grove was the only opinion of the Court consistent
with Hanna v. Plumer,54 which crystalized REA analysis, it is important
to understand the evolution of REA conflict of law analysis to
understand how Shady Grove affects the status of anti-SLAPP laws in
federal courts.55

49.

Donald L. Doernberg, “The Tempest”: Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co.: The Rules Enabling Act Decision
That Added to the Confusion—But Should Not Have, 44 Akron L. Rev.
1147, 1151 (2011).

50.

See id. at 1150 (“Unfortunately, Erie left difficult problems in its wake.”).

51.

See, e.g., Saner, supra note 32, at 785; Doernberg, supra note 49, at 1208.

52.

28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). The structure of this analysis is also referred to
as Hanna analysis since it derives from Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460
(1965).

53.

28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012). This is also generally known as Erie analysis
since it actually determines whether the state law is substantive in nature.
See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469. The plurality in Shady Grove never reached
analysis under the RDA and even the concurrence did not add anything
substantial to Erie doctrine when a state law passes muster under the
REA. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S.
Ct. 1431 (2010).

54.

380 U.S. 460 (1965).

55.

Kevin M. Clermont, Repressible Myth of Shady Grove, 86 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 987, 1013 (2011).
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The Evolution of REA Analysis Before Shady Grove

In Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,56 Justice Brandeis wrote an
opinion that overruled the Supreme Court’s previous decision in Swift
v. Tyson.57 Swift had determined, under the RDA, that general federal
common law preempts state common law in federal courts sitting in
diversity.58 Under Erie, the new interpretation of the RDA became that
“there is no general federal common law,” and so state common law
generally controls in federal diversity cases.59 Since state statutory law
and common law are substantive, Erie commands federal courts to
apply those state and federal procedural laws to federal diversity cases.60
At first, Erie looked like it had announced a clear command for federal
courts to apply state law, but the line between procedure and substance
became variable.61 Courts applying Erie did not help by neglecting to
give an explanation about how substance differs from procedure.62
Adding to the confusion, the Supreme Court of the United States has
been working backwards somewhat in developing the analysis, causing
“unguided” decisions.63

56.

304 U.S. 64 (1938).

57.

41 U.S. 1 (1842).

58.

See id.

59.

Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. See also Jay Tidmarsh, Procedure, Substance, and
Erie, 64 Vand. L. Rev. 877, 878 (2011) (“Erie itself commanded that
federal courts apply state substantive law, rather than ‘federal general
common law,’ to claims that lie within diversity jurisdiction.”).

60.

See John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 Harv. L. Rev.
693, 696 (1974) (“Originally it was believed that Erie simply commanded
the application of state law to substantive issues, but permitted federal
courts to handle procedure problems their own way.”); see also Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).

61.

See Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring); Sibbach v. Wilson, 312
U.S. 1, 6 (1940); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471; Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1450 (2010) (Stevens,
J., concurring).

62.

See S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305, 311
(7th Cir. 1995) (“[A]t least for the purpose of making out the scope of the
Erie decision, the terms ‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are conclusions rather
than algorithms.”).

63.

See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471; Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1456–57 (Stevens,
J., concurring). For a more thorough discussion on the various aspects of
the conflict of law analysis and the evolution of Erie doctrine prior to
Shady Grove, see Lisa Litwiller, A SLAPP in the Face: Why Principles
of Federalism Suggest That Federal District Courts Should Stop Turning
the Other Cheek, 1 J. Ct. Innovation 67, 73–83 (2008).
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The first challenge to Erie came in Sibbach v. Wilson.64 Just before
Sibbach, Congress had passed the REA.65 The REA gives the Supreme
Court the ability to promulgate rules of procedure so long as those rules
do not infringe on substantive rights.66 Shortly thereafter, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect.67 Sibbach asked whether, and
under what circumstances, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could
be invalid under the REA.68 Justice Roberts decided this issue by
refusing to equate the term “substantive right” in the REA with the
notion of an “important right.”69 Indeed, since every Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure embraces “important rights,” the test for validity could
not be whether the rule changes “important rights,” because procedural
rules will always affect “important rights.”70 The test for whether a
federal rule was valid under the REA was and is “whether a rule really
regulates procedure.”71 This means that if a rule regulates procedure at
all, it will be valid under the REA.72 The decision in Sibbach has since
become the tail of REA analysis, and its test is all but a foregone
conclusion because the Supreme Court has rejected every challenge to
a rule under the REA.73
The next contribution to REA analysis came in Hanna v. Plumer,74
in which Chief Justice Warren backtracked a bit.75 Hanna determined
64.

Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 1.

65.

Id. at 7; see 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).

66.

See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072(a)–(b) (2012).

67.

See Allan Ides, The Standard for Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure: The Shady Grove Debate Between Justices Scalia and
Stevens, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1041, 1051 (2011) (observing that the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into effect September 16, 1938).

68.

See Sibbach, 312 U.S. at 9 (“The contention of the petitioner, in final
analysis, is that Rules 35 and 37 are not within the mandate of Congress
to this court.”).

69.

See id. at 13.

70.

See id.

71.

Id. at 14.

72.

See Ides, supra note 67, at 1054 (concluding that Sibbach’s admission that
Rule 35 did regulate procedure while contesting that it regulated other
rights led the court to find that the rule was valid).

73.

See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1442 (2010) (“Applying that test, we have rejected every statutory
challenge to a Federal Rule that has come before us.”).

74.

380 U.S. 460 (1965).

75.

Prior to Hanna, there were several very influential opinions on RDA
analysis. One of the most notable is Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 356 U.S.
525 (1958), which produced the outcome determinative test. According to
this test, if the application of the federal rule would change the outcome
of the case, the state law applied. Id. at 108–09. But keep in mind that
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that a federal rule applies any time it is broad enough to cover the issue
in dispute.76 The Court found that there are two different “lines of
cases” under Erie that are meant to “control very different sorts of
decisions.”77 One of these types of cases is evaluated under the REA,
while the other type is evaluated under RDA.78 According to Hanna, a
court should first conduct analysis under the REA by asking whether
the federal rule is broad enough in scope to clash with the state law.79
If the scope of the federal rule is not broad enough to control, then the
court will conduct the RDA analysis.80 If the scope of the rule and the
scope of the state law overlap, the inquiry moves to the Sibbach test of
whether the federal rule “really regulates procedure.”81
To sum up, REA analysis uses a two-step inquiry. The first inquiry
is whether there is an “unavoidable” or “direct” conflict between the
scope of the state law and the federal rule. If there is a direct collision,
then REA asks the second question: whether the federal rule in question
this is not the same test for procedure and substance under the REA.
York was later modified by Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356
U.S. 525 (1958), which, instead of performing an outcome determinative
test, balanced state and federal interests. If the state had a compelling
interest for having the law apply in federal courts and federal interest is
not equally compelling, then the state law applies in federal court. Id. at
538–40.
76.

See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470 (“But the holding of each [case where a federal
rule did not preempt a state law] was not that Erie commanded
displacement of a Federal Rule by an inconsistent state rule, but rather
that the scope of the Federal Rule was not as broad as the losing party
urged, and therefore, there being no Federal Rule which covered the point
in dispute, Erie commanded the enforcement of state law.”).

77.

Id. at 471.

78.

Id.; see also Ely, supra note 60, at 722–23.

79.

Methods of interpretation for the scope of the state law and the federal
rule have also been variable. In Hanna, the conflict was based on the use
of a state law to require in-hand service of process as opposed to Rule
4(d)(1), which does not. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 461–62 (noting the
language of Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 197, § 9 (1958) and Fed. R.
Civ. P. 4(d)(1)). Warren’s reading of the state law’s scope was limited to
its procedural effects, which would have only altered “the way in which
process was served.” Id. at 469. In a subsequent case, Justice Marshall
read in two substantive state policies into the scope of the state law: to
give the defendant “peace of mind” and prevent the unfairness of making
a defendant litigate an old claim. Walker v. Armco Steel, 446 U.S. 740,
751 (1979). But in Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, Marshall interpreted
the state scope only for its procedural effect of depriving the Court of
discretion whether to impose a monetary penalty on frivolous appeals. 480
U.S. 1, 7 (1986). Thus there was no clear way to interpret the scope of a
state statute for the purpose of REA analysis before Shady Grove.

80.

Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.

81.

Id. at 464, 470.
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is valid under the REA. If it is, and it always is, then the federal rule
preempts the state law. This is how the analysis was understood up
until 2010, when the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Shady Grove.
2.

Giving the Federal Rules More Bite: Shady Grove

This section discusses how the plurality in Shady Grove modifies
the Erie doctrine. The plurality in Shady Grove should be accepted as
the most recent progeny of Erie because it is the only opinion of the
Court consistent with Hanna. Before Shady Grove, state law could only
limit a federal rule’s power to preempt with “stubby” teeth.82 Shady
Grove took those teeth from stubs to near nonexistence in three ways.
First, Justice Scalia’s opinion affirmed Hanna. Second, Shady Grove’s
plurality broadened the scope of federal rules. Third, the plurality
narrowly interpreted the possibly conflicting state law.
The dispute in Shady Grove arose out of a New York state law that
prohibited “class action in suits seeking penalties or statutory minimum
damages.”83 Shady Grove claimed that Allstate Insurance owed unpaid
statutory interest to itself and a class of others.84 If the statutory
interest was barred from consideration under New York state law, then
Shady Grove’s claim would fall short of the amount in controversy
requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction.85 Under Rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, there is no bar on accepting a claim
based on statutory interest.86 If the New York law controlled the suit,
then Shady Grove would not be able to proceed as a class action; but
if the New York law did not control, then a federal court could have
jurisdiction over the matter under Rule 23.87

82.

Clermont, supra note 55, at 994.

83.

Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1436 (2010). See generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) (McKinney 2006)
(“Unless a statute creating or imposing a penalty, or a minimum measure
of recovery specifically authorizes the recover thereof in a class action, an
action to recover a penalty, or minimum measure of recovery created or
imposed by statute may not be maintained as a class action.”).

84.

Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1436–37.

85.

Id. at 1437 (“Shady Grove conceded that its individual claim (worth
roughly $500) fell far short of the amount in controversy requirement for
individual suits under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).”). See generally 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a) (2012) (requiring that the amount in dispute be in excess of
$75,000 for federal diversity jurisdiction).

86.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23; Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437.

87.

Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1437. See also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b)
(McKinney 2006).
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First, Justice Scalia applied the REA analysis announced in
Hanna.88 Second, Scalia gave great breadth to the federal rule by
analyzing it according to its plain language. Rule 23 allows a litigant
to maintain an action if certain preconditions are satisfied.89 A plaintiff,
not a court, has discretion to decide whether to bring suit,90 and as long
as the plaintiff satisfies the conditions set out in Rule 23, she may bring
the action.91 Justice Scalia went a step further and determined that a
federal rule is only qualified by an act of Congress or by the rule’s own
language because otherwise a court could determine whether a plaintiff
could sue.92 Since neither an act of Congress nor the text of Rule 23
made it subject to state law “certification,” it would be impermissible
for the state law requiring certification to modify Rule 23.93
Furthermore, the Court could not agree with Allstate’s contention that
there is a difference between “certifying” and “maintaining” an action.94
The thrust of this reading of the federal rule is one that prevents
the federal rule from being qualified by a state law if the federal rule or
Congress does not explicitly allow for such a limitation. This
interpretation was strengthened by the fact that Congress had created
specific exceptions to Rule 23.95 If Rule 23 did not apply generally, there
would be no need to create such exceptions.96
Third, Justice Scalia did not choose a favorable reading of the New
York law. Scalia refused to read the purpose of the state law into the
scope and cautioned future courts not to do so.97 In fact, the plurality
discerned the scope of the state law based only on its procedural
88.

See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442–44 (reviewing Erie and its progeny
and concluding that the Court must apply the “direct collision” test
announced in Hanna).

89.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the
class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there
are questions of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses
of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.”).

90.

Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438.

91.

Id.

92.

Id.

93.

Id.

94.

Id.

95.

Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(1)(B) (2012) (preventing a court from certifying
a class in “action for which judicial review is authorized under a
subsequent paragraph of this subjection”).

96.

Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438.

97.

See id. at 1444 (“[T]he substantive nature of New York’s law, or its
substantive purpose, makes no difference.”).
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effects.98 This happened in spite of the urgings of Justice Stevens to
consider state “interests” and “policies” in order to adopt a reading that
could save the state law.99 Indeed, the plurality’s reading of the state
law was not the only possible reading. The New York law prevented a
plaintiff from maintaining a class action “seeking statutory penalties.”100
The law could have been viewed as a bar on damages, which is a
recognized matter of substance.101 Still, Scalia determined that the New
York law “prevent[ed] the class actions it covers from coming into
existence at all.”102 Thus, the state law impermissibly limited the federal
rule.
Even more damaging, the framers of the New York law modeled it
after Rule 23. The New York state law tracked Rule 23 in one part and
in another part “impose[d] additional requirements.”103 The imposition
of additional requirements while utilizing the language of Rule 23 made
it evident that the New York law was meant to limit the cases that
could be “maintained” under Rule 23.104 Echoing precedent, Scalia
observed that the New York law would leave to the court’s discretion
whether a plaintiff can bring a class action suit, whereas Rule 23 allows
for a class action to be brought automatically.105

98.

Id. at 1439 (finding that the text of Section 901(b) and Rule 23 overlapped
in scope by tracking the same issues in one section but then trying to
diverge in another). Ginsburg argued that if the province of the New York
law was traditionally that of substance, then the federal rule should yield.
See id. at 1461–62 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The dissent took particular
note of Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). In Palmer, the Court
ruled that “[r]ule 8(c) covers only the manner of pleading. The question
of burden of establishing contributory negligence is a question of local law
which federal courts in diversity of citizenship . . . must apply.” Id. at 117
(citation omitted).

99.

Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1452 (Stevens, J., concurring) (finding that if
the state law could be “reasonably interpreted to avoid [an] impermissible
result,” then there is a “sensitivity” to state interests and policies).

100. Id. at 1439 (plurality opinion). See also N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b)
(McKinney 2006).
101. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1465 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
102. Id. at 1439 (plurality opinion).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See id. (satisfying the criteria of Rule 23 automatically enables a plaintiff
to bring a class action suit in federal court; under N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b),
there are preconditions that must be satisfied before the criteria of Rule
23 are even addressed). See also Walker v. Armco Steel, 446 U.S. 740, 750
n.9 (1979) (“This is not to suggest that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to avoid a ‘direct
collision’ with state law. The Federal Rules should be given their plain
meaning.”).
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At the end of Justice Scalia’s analysis, the plurality inquired
whether Rule 23 functions to “‘abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right’” in contravention of the REA.106 In keeping with its
formalist tradition,107 the Court asked whether the federal rule “really
regulates procedure.”108 This inquiry is limited to whether the federal
rule “governs only ‘the manner and the means’ by which the litigants’
rights are ‘enforced,’” or if the rule will alter the “‘rules of decision by
which [the] court will adjudicate [those] rights.’”109 If the rule alters the
rules of decision, it is not valid under the REA. Every decision before
the Supreme Court that had considered this question had rejected the
challenge to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Shady Grove was no
exception.110
Although this analysis may seem prejudiced against state laws, it
was the only opinion in Shady Grove that squared with REA analysis
and Hanna. The rule that should emerge from the fractured opinions in
Shady Grove is whatever rule comprises the “narrowest grounds” upon
which the concurring members of the Court agree.111 Courts and
scholars since Shady Grove have argued that Justice Stevens’s concurrence most accurately depicts the narrowest rule of Shady Grove.112
This is incorrect because on its “narrowest grounds,” Shady Grove
affirmed Hanna,113 whereas Justice Stevens’s concurrence does not.
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, advocated that a direct conflict
between a state law and a federal rule could be resolved in favor of the
state law.114 This could take place when the state law is “so bound up
106. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (2012)).
107. See Joseph P. Bauer, Shedding Light on Shady Grove: Further Reflections
on the Erie Doctrine from a Conflicts Perspective, 86 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 939, 974 (2011) (describing the question “whether a federal rule
really regulates procedure” as a formalistic approach).
108. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442.
109. Id. (quoting Miss. Publ’g Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 439, 446 (1945)).
110. Id. at 1443.
111. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)).
112. See, e.g., Colin Quinlan, Erie and the First Amendment: State AntiSLAPP Laws in Federal Court After Shady Grove, 114 Colum. L. Rev.
367, 387–88 (2014) (discussing various views on the opinions in Shady
Grove); Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 87 (1st Cir. 2012) (applying
Justice Sevens’s concurrence to determine whether the applicability of
anti-SLAPP statutes in federal courts).
113. See Clermont, supra note 55, at 1013 (“Shady Grove may not say much
for eternity, but it does say that the unadorned Sibbach-Hanna test, so
protective of the Federal Rules, is the law.”).
114. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1448 (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that
a direct collision “does not mean . . . that the federal rule always governs”).
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with [or sufficiently intertwined with a substantive] state-created right
or remedy that it defines the scope of that substantive right or
remedy.”115 A court would determine this in a two-step analysis. First,
a court would analyze whether the federal rule leaves “no room for the
operation” of the state law.116 The second step, which Stevens admitted
is substantially similar to the first, would be whether there is a direct
collision between the state law and the federal rule.117
Plainly, this test would not affirm the REA analysis announced in
Hanna: first, whether a federal rule and a state law directly conflict,
and second, whether applying the federal rule would violate the REA.118
Therefore, Justice Stevens’s concurrence cannot constitute the
“narrowest grounds” of the Court’s decision. Moreover, Justice Stevens’s reasoning actually violates Hanna. The crux of Justice Stevens’s
analysis is whether the state law is substantive119—an analysis the
Court in Hanna did not apply.120 Moreover, Justice Scalia’s reasoning
for rejecting an analysis of the substantive scope or purpose of a state
law, for the purposes of REA analysis, makes sense within the Court’s
ruling in Hanna.
If the purpose of every state law defends the scope of that law, for
the purposes of REA analysis, the result would be incoherent. For
example, the federal rules could preempt a state law in a certain jurisdiction where the state law did not have a substantive scope, but an
identical state law in another jurisdiction would apply in federal court
because its purpose was substantive. Scalia categorically ruled this
out.121 To do otherwise requires courts to decide the substance of the
law and the scope. This would make REA analysis turn on whether the

115. Id. at 1450.
116. Id. at 1451 (quoting Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 45 (1987)).
117. Id. at 1452.
118. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 464 (1964).
119. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1450 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“A state procedural
rule, though undeniably procedural in the ordinary sense of the term, may
exist ‘to influence substantive outcomes, . . . and may in some instances
become so bound up with the state-created right or remedy that it defines
the scope of that substantive right or remedy.”) (citations omitted).
120. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470 (holding that the question of whether a federal
rule displaces state law is determined based on the existence of a direct
collision); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 (1979)
(observing analysis under Hanna starts with the existence of a direct
collision between the federal rule and the state law).
121. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 (“A Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
is not valid in some jurisdictions and invalid in others—or valid in some
cases and invalid in others—depending upon whether its effects frustrate
a state substantive law (or a state procedural law enacted for substantive
purposes).”).
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state law is substantive or procedural; something the Supreme Court
has forbidden.122
B. How Shady Grove Has Been Applied in
Federal Courts Examining Anti-SLAPP Statutes

Federal courts sitting in diversity have yet to agree on whether the
Erie Doctrine requires that federal rules preempt anti-SLAPP laws.
Although the majority of federal courts that have addressed the issue
have found that anti-SLAPP laws are not preempted by federal rules,
none of those courts agree on why. Generally these decisions fall into
three categories: (1) those that did not apply Shady Grove, (2) those
that misapplied Shady Grove, and (3) those that tracked Shady Grove.
When the opinions are divided in this way, there appears to be a trend
that anti-SLAPP laws are preempted by federal rules when a federal
court’s analysis tracks the plurality in Shady Grove.
1.

Circuit Court Decisions

The Ninth Circuit was the first circuit court to tackle the issue in
United States ex rel Newsham v. Lockheed Missiles & Space
Company.123 Newsham took place well over ten years before Shady
Grove was decided; consequently it did not apply Shady Grove’s
contribution to REA analysis. The case involved more than a decade
of litigation over complex legal issues and one claim that provoked the
plaintiffs to file a motion under California’s anti-SLAPP statute.124
Lockheed, the defendant, filed a counterclaim to the plaintiff’s original
claim that the plaintiffs “breached duties imposed by fiduciary
obligations and loyalty, as well as contract and statute, and breached
the implied covenant of good faith.”125 Judge Bryan, writing the
opinion, looked to whether Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

122. See, e.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470 (holding that Erie commands that the
Federal Rule displace state substantive law when “the scope of the Federal
Rule was not as broad as the losing party” urges); Shady Grove, 130 S.
Ct. at 1444 (“[I]t is not the substantive or procedural nature or purpose
of the affected state law that matters, but the substantive or procedural
nature of the federal rule.”); Walker, 446 U.S. at 749 (observing that
analysis under Hanna starts with the existence of a direct collision
between the federal rule and the state law); Intercon Solutions, Inc. v.
Basel Action Net., 969 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (N.D. Ill.2013) (“[T]he courts
reached their holdings by essentially doing exactly what Shady Grove
advised against—diving into Erie’s murky waters to determine whether
the state law in question [sic] procedural or substantive without ever
assessing in the first place whether the Federal Rules provide an answer
to the question.”).
123. 190 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 1999).
124. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16 (West 2013).
125. Newsham, 190 F.3d at 967.
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and 56 “directly conflicted” with the motion to “strike” in California’s
anti-SLAPP law.126
The Ninth Circuit in Newsham found no “direct collision” between
a federal rule and California’s anti-SLAPP statute.127 The court’s
analysis was guided by Walker v. Armco Steel128 and turned on whether
the federal rules and the anti-SLAPP motion to strike could “exist side
by side . . . each controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without
conflict.”129 The court acknowledged that the federal rules and
California’s anti-SLAPP law’s motion to strike served the similar
purpose of expediting the “weeding out of meritless claims before
trial.”130 But the court gave two reasons why this overlap in purpose
was not a direct collision. First, there was “no indication” that the
federal rules in question were intended to “weed[] out meritless claims”
through “pretrial procedures.”131 Second, the anti-SLAPP statute was
made for “the protection of the ‘constitutional right of freedom of
speech and petition,’” which the federal rules do not address.132
Moreover, an unsuccessful motion to strike under California’s antiSLAPP statute would not, in any way, prohibit subsequent motions
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56, and so the court
found that the federal rules and the state statute governed independent
spheres and could coexist.133 Had the court been able to apply Shady
Grove, the analysis would have given the federal rules a broad scope,
increasing the likelihood of a direct collision. In particular, it falls within
the broad authority of Rules 56 and 12(b)(6) to dismiss frivolous claims
before trial, despite the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion to the opposite.134
Furthermore, narrowing the scope of the state statute to the protection
of constitutional rights does not remove it from the scope of a federal
rule if the federal rule applies generally.135 Since the court could not
apply Shady Grove, it found no direct collision in its REA analysis and
126. Id. at 972 (relying on the standard established in Walker v. Armco Steel
Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1980)).
127. Id. at 972.
128. 446 U.S. 740 (1979).
129. Id. at 752.
130. Newsham, 190 F.3d at 972.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 973 (citing Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 425.16(a)).
133. Id. at 972.
134. Edward J. Brunet et al., Summary Judgment: Federal Law and
Practice § 1.1 (2014) (describing Rule 12(b) and 56 as the primary
vehicle for dismissing frivolous claims).
135. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1438 (2010) (understanding the broad scope of Rule 23 as colliding
with the narrow scope of the New York state law).
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went on to apply RDA analysis, ultimately finding that the antiSLAPP statute applied in federal court.136
In 2009, just before Shady Grove, the Fifth Circuit in Henry v. Lake
Charles American Press LLC137 determined that anti-SLAPP laws do
apply in federal courts.138 This also places Henry in the category of cases
that did not apply Shady Grove. Not only did Henry not apply Shady
Grove, but it also did not conduct any sort of conflict of law analysis
at all when evaluating the applicability of Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP
statute in federal court.139 According to the Fifth Circuit, “Louisiana
law, including the nominally-procedural [anti-SLAPP statute], governs
this diversity case.”140 While Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute actually
may apply in federal court, the Fifth Circuit’s conclusory finding on
the issue has proven to be unhelpful. In the first place, concluding that
the anti-SLAPP statute was substantive violates principles of REA
analysis announced before Shady Grove.141 What is worse is that the
court’s lack of analysis culminated in declaring that the anti-SLAPP
statute creates a right to prevail in trial and “creates a right not to
stand trial” that is, effectively, unreviewable.142 In other words, the
Fifth Circuit determined that Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP law creates a
whole new right. If an anti-SLAPP law creates a new right, it could not
be a right contemplated by any existing federal rule. Subsequently, the
view that anti-SLAPP statutes create the right of immunity from trial
has proven to be pervasive in district courts and circuit courts.
The First Circuit was the first circuit court to address applicability
of anti-SLAPP laws in federal courts after Shady Grove. In doing so, it
applied Shady Grove but relied heavily on Justice Stevens’s concurrence
and the court in Henry, placing it in the “misapplied Shady Grove”
136. Newsham, 190 F.3d at 973.
137. 566 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2009).
138. Id.
139. See La. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. art. 971 (Supp. 2014).
140. Henry, 566 F.3d at 168–69 (emphasis added). What is even more
surprising is that neither decision in the antecedent district court
conducted a conflict of law analysis or inquired into the nature of the
anti-SLAPP statute. See Henry v. Lake Charles Am. Press, LLC, No. 2:06
CV 1513, 2008 WL 398506 (W.D. La. Feb. 12, 2008); Henry v. Lake
Charles Am. Press, LLC, No. 2:06 CV 1513, 2007 WL 3341317 (W.D. La.
Nov. 7, 2007).
141. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1964) (holding that Erie
commands that the Federal Rule displace state substantive law); Shady
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 (“It is not the substantive or procedural nature
or purpose of the affected state law that matters, but the substantive or
procedural nature of the federal rule.”); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446
U.S. 740, 749 (1979) (observing that analysis under Hanna starts with the
existence of a direct collision between the federal rule and the state law).
142. Henry, 566 F.3d at 178 n.*.
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category. Godin v. Schencks143 echoed the court in Henry by
distinguishing between a law creating the right to prevail in trial and a
law which creates the right not to be tried at all; Maine’s anti-SLAPP
statute was the latter.144 The court believed that if it did not have the
authority to review this type of right, the right’s value would be
destroyed.145
The rules at issue in Godin were Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
56 and 12.146 The court decided that Rules 12 and 56 governed “general”
federal procedure and applied to all “categories of cases.”147 Rule 56
specifically works for a party to secure judgment before trial after the
fact finder has evaluated the material facts and determined that they
do not present a disputed issue.148 This reading seems to give federal
rules broad authority under Shady Grove, since there is no category of
case in which the federal rules would not apply.
Despite this reading of the federal rules, the First Circuit did not
find a direct collision with Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute. The court read
a motion under Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute to govern “special
procedures for state claims based on a defendant’s petitioning activity.”149 This violated Shady Grove because instead of avoiding an inquiry into the state law’s substantive or procedural nature, the First
Circuit gave the issue center stage in its analysis. The court determined
that a special motion to dismiss under Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute is
so “‘intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to define
the scope of the state created right,’ it cannot be displaced by Rule

143. 629 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010). Interestingly, the First Circuit in Godin did
not even address the decision in Stuborn Ltd. P’ship v. Bernstein, 245 F.
Supp. 2d 312, 314 (D. Mass. 2003), the District of Massachusetts being a
district court in the First Circuit, which had not applied Massachusetts’s
anti-SLAPP statute because it conflicted with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. See id. at 312. By contrast, Godin relied on Shady Grove in
concluding that anti-SLAPP statutes must apply in federal courts, albeit
the court relied heavily on Justice Steven’s concurrence. See Godin, 629
F.3d at 79. While it may seem that these decisions damage this Note’s
conclusion, the opposite is true. Had the First Circuit applied the plurality
of Shady Grove and stayed away from an evaluation of the substance of
Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute, the conclusion of Godin likely would have
been in conformity with Stuborn.
144. Godin, 629 F.3d at 85.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 86.
147. Id. at 88.
148. Id. at 89.
149. Id. at 88.
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12(b)(6) or Rule 56.”150 Moreover, Maine’s anti-SLAPP statute requires
a court to consider whether a claim has a “reasonable basis in fact or
law” and “actual injury,” whereas Rule 56 does not.151 But this is also
dubious according the broad authority given to federal rules under
Shady Grove, since summary judgment does require an inquiry into the
facts underlying the case.152 The First Circuit further ran afoul of Shady
Grove by determining that the anti-SLAPP statute had a substantive
scope by providing a substantive defense.153 Finding no direct collision,
the First Circuit went on to apply the anti-SLAPP statute and dismiss
the case.154
Other circuit courts have addressed the applicability of anti-SLAPP
statutes in federal court. Unfortunately, there is little this Note can
draw from those opinions. In Royalty Network, Inc. v. Harris,155 the
Eleventh Circuit deviated from the trend of applying anti-SLAPP
statutes in federal courts because Georgia’s version of law impermissibly
conflicted with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.156 However, this
conflict is largely due to the unique requirement of Georgia’s antiSLAPP statute that a plaintiff file a written verification
contemporaneous with the complaint, certifying that the complaint is
not meant to “suppress a person’s or entity’s right of free speech.”157
Based on this requirement, the Eleventh Circuit found that Georgia’s
anti-SLAPP statute impermissibly conflicted with Rule 11, which generally does not require a pleading to be “verified or accompanied by an

150. Id. at 89 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1452 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring)).
151. Id.
152. See Brunet et al., supra note 134, at § 1.1 (noting that Rule 56 exists
to screen out claims that are facially adequate but are not substantiated
by facts underlying those claims). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (“The court
shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”)
153. Godin, 629 F.3d at 89.
154. Id. at 92.
155. 756 F.3d 1351 (11th Cir. 2014).
156. See id. at 1361.
157. Id. at 1359. See generally Ga. Code Ann. § 9-11-11.1(b) (West 2014)
(requiring both a plaintiff and her attorney to submit a written
verification that the claim “to the best of their knowledge, . . . is not
interposed for any improper purpose such as to suppress a person’s or
entity’s right of free speech or right to petition government, or to harass,
or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation,”
if the “claim asserted against a person or . . . could reasonably be
construed as an act in furtherance of the right of free speech”).
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affidavit.”158 The Eleventh Circuit did not conduct a rigorous REA
analysis under Shady Grove because it frankly did not need to; the
conflict between the federal rule and the state law was readily apparent.159 This puts Royalty Network in the “did not apply Shady
Grove” category.
The Second Circuit also recently gave consideration to whether
anti-SLAPP statutes conflict with the federal rules of civil procedure.160
Unfortunately, the court in Adelson v. Harris left much to be desired
in evaluating Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statute.161 The court avoided
conducting any sort of conflict of law analysis and instead leaned on
Godin, Henry, and Newsham.162 Based on the conclusions in those cases,
the Second Circuit came to the following conclusions:
(1) [The Nevada Statute] would apply in state court had
suit been filed there; (2) is substantive within the
meaning of Erie, since it is consequential enough that
enforcement in federal proceedings will serve to
discourage forum shopping and avoid inequity; and (3)
does not squarely conflict with a valid federal rule.163
That comprised the beginning and the end of the Second Circuit’s
conflict of law analysis, making it one of the courts that “misapplied
Shady Grove.” Making matters worse, stare decisis has counseled the
few circuit courts that have already decided the issue to avoid any REA
analysis and apply anti-SLAPP statutes in federal courts.164
158. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a).
159. See Royalty Network, 756 F.3d at 1359 (“Based on the plain text of the
state law and the federal rule, it is apparent that the federal rule is broad
enough to cover the issue and that the two directly conflict.”).
160. See Adelson v. Harris, 774 F.3d 803 (2d Cir. 2014).
161. See id. at 809 (“We, therefore, decide it as a threshold matter on the facts
of this case. While our Circuit has not previously examined the issue, the
specific state anti-SLAPP provisions applied by the district court . . .
seem to us unproblematic.”).
162. See id. (discussing cases in other circuits deciding the same issue).
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., NCDR, LLC. v. Mauze & Bagby, PLLC, 745 F.3d, 742, 752–53
(5th Cir. 2014) (assuming that Texas’s anti-SLAPP statute applies in
federal court because the defendant has not raised a possible conflict with
the rules of civil procedure as an issue prior to appearing before the Fifth
Circuit); Makaeff v. Trump University, LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 261 (9th Cir.
2013) (applying California’s anti-SLAPP statute without any inquiry into
a conflict with the federal rules of procedure); Lynch v. Christie, 486 Fed.
Appx. 884, 885 (1st Cir. 2012) (remanding to the lower court without
reaching the issue of the court’s jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal,
let alone the anti-SLAPP statute’s applicability). Perhaps the most
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Overall, no circuit court that has had the opportunity to decide
whether anti-SLAPP statutes apply in federal courts has given Shady
Grove its due weight. Rather, the decisions of the circuit courts have
been confusing—looking at the substantive rights anti-SLAPP statutes
are intended to protect. However, “what matters is the law the
Legislature did enact,” not the law it intended to enact.165 Even the
federal rules have been somewhat neglected, as none of the circuit
courts addressed a possible conflict with Rule 12(d), a rule to which
district courts have paid a good amount of attention. Those reasons
necessitate a new analysis to ascertain whether there really is a conflict.
2.

District Court Decisions

The most prominent approach by district courts has been to apply
anti-SLAPP statutes in federal courts, relying on previous decisions of
circuit courts.166 On one hand, the doctrine of stare decisis urges the
district courts to follow the decision of circuit courts under which they
sit.167 At the same time, stare decisis does not bind all district courts
to follow the decision of the circuit courts that have decided the
applicability of anti-SLAPP laws. Still, most district courts have
followed the circuit court decisions above as persuasive, failing to rectify
the analysis.168
Other district courts have been confused about how to start
analysis under the REA, so they begin with an inquiry into the
substantive nature of the anti-SLAPP statute—an analysis that the
surprising case is Sherrod v. Breitbart, 720 F.3d 923 (1st Cir. 2013), in
which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia did not address
the potential conflict between the District of Columbia’s anti-SLAPP
statute and the federal rules of civil procedure despite the lower court’s
finding a conflict and denying the statute’s motion to dismiss on that
basis. Id. at 934.
165. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assoc., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431,
1440 (2010).
166. See, e.g., Louisiana Crisis Ass’t Ctr. v. Marzano-Lesnevich, 878 F. Supp.
2d 662 (E.D. La. 2012) (holding that Louisiana’s anti-SLAPP statute
could be used to strike claims and theories of relief); New.net, Inc. v.
Lavasoft, 356 F. Supp. 2d 1090 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (utilizing the decision in
Newsham to apply California’s anti-SLAPP statute); Bargantine v.
Mechanics Cooperative Bank, No. 13-11132-NMG, 2013 WL 6211845 (D.
Mass. Nov. 26, 2013) (using Godin to apply Massachusetts’s anti-SLAPP
statute); Boley v. Atl. Monthly Grp., 950 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 (D.D.C.
2013) (following Henry, Newsham, and Godin).
167. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1537 (9th ed. 2009) (“Vertical Stare
Decisis: The doctrine that a court must strictly follow the decisions
handed down by higher courts within the same jurisdiction.”).
168. See, e.g., Boley, 950 F. Supp. 2d at 254; Adelson v. Harris, No. 12 Civ.
6052(JPO), 2013 WL 5420973, at *20 n.21 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013);
Farah v. Esquire Magazine, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 29, 36 n.10 (D.D.C. 2012).
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Supreme Court has specifically contemplated and abandoned.169 Not
surprisingly, courts that take this approach follow Godin and Henry in
coming to the conclusion that anti-SLAPP laws “create[] a new
category” of rights or immunities related to a defendant’s first amendment claims.170 Reading in such substantive rights or intent violates the
plurality opinion in Shady Grove.171 But since the party that files a
special motion to dismiss under an anti-SLAPP statute is invoking a
substantive right, the anti-SLAPP law unquestionably applies in federal
courts.172 These types of cases are similar to cases that apply antiSLAPP statutes based solely on stare decisis because Godin and Henry
heavily influence the determinations on the substance of anti-SLAPP
statutes in both situations. These two closely related views have
comprised the majority of decisions in federal courts, so anti-SLAPP
laws are typically applied in federal courts.173

169. See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470 (1964) (holding that Erie
commands that the Federal Rule displace state substantive law); Shady
Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1444 (“[I]t is not the substantive or procedural nature
or purpose of the affected state law that matters, but the substantive or
procedural nature of the federal rule.”); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446
U.S. 740, 749 (1979) (observing analysis under Hanna starts with the
existence of a direct collision between the federal rule and the state law);
Intercon Solutions, Inc. v. Basel Action Net., 969 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1053
(N.D. Ill. 2013) (“[T]he courts reached their holdings by essentially doing
exactly what Shady Grove advised against—diving into Erie’s murky
waters to determine whether the state law in question [is] procedural or
substantive without ever assessing in the first place whether the Federal
Rules provide an answer to the question.”).
170. Trudeau v. ConsumerAffairs.com, Inc., No. 10 C 7193, 2011 WL 3898041,
at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 2011). While the District Court of Massachusetts
did analyze the procedural or substantive nature of Massachusetts’s antiSLAPP statute, it did so for the sole purpose of finding whether there was
a “direct conflict” with a federal rule. See Stuborn Ltd. P’ship v.
Bernstein, 245 F. Supp. 2d 312, 315–16 (D. Mass. 2003).
171. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1440 (“[W]hat matters is the law the
Legislature did enact.”). Giving weight to the substantive scope of the
anti-SLAPP statute would be a violation of Shady Grove. See id. at 1444
(finding that the “substantive nature” or the “substantive purpose” of a
state law “makes no difference” for the purpose of REA analysis)
(emphasis in original).
172. See Farah v. Esquire Magazine, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 2d 29, 36 n.10 (D.D.C.
2012) (finding persuasive the view that anti-SLAPP laws are substantive
and therefore apply in federal court); Sherrod v. Breitbart, 843 F. Supp.
2d 83, 85 (D.D.C. 2012) (deciding that the D.C. anti-SLAPP must be
substantive and therefore cannot apply retroactively but would
otherwise).
173. Boley v. Atl. Monthly Grp., 950 F. Supp. 2d 249, 254 (D.D.C. 2013)
(deciding not to follow courts which preempt anti-SLAPP statutes with
federal rules because such cases “conflict[] with the weight of authority”).
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Since Shady Grove, courts that have applied Justice Scalia’s
plurality have determined that the anti-SLAPP statutes and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure answer the same question. These courts
have not considered the substantive purpose or grant of immunity in
their analysis. Instead, in evaluating the scope of the anti-SLAPP
statutes, the district courts tracked Shady Grove and only considered
the anti-SLAPP statutes’ procedural effects.174 Those courts have paid
a good deal of attention to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d).175
Rule 12(d) requires that motions under 12(b)(6) be treated as a motion
for summary judgment where information extrinsic to the pleadings is
submitted to the court.176 Generally, anti-SLAPP statutes require
courts to consider affidavits supporting the underlying facts in deciding
a special motion to dismiss.177 Courts have determined that since a
special motion to dismiss under a state anti-SLAPP law and Rule 12(d)
control the same issue because both require courts to consider
information extrinsic to the pleadings along with the pleadings
themselves.178 The anti-SLAPP statutes impermissibly conflict with
Rule 12(d) because anti-SLAPP statutes require courts to consider
matters outside the pleadings, whereas Rule 12(d) does not.179 One
district court even found that anti-SLAPP statutes collide with Federal
Rules 12(b)(6) and 56 because those rules use procedural mechanisms
to dismiss frivolous claims.180 Since the federal rules in question are
174. See Intercon, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1044, 1047 (observing that anti-SLAPP
statutes deprive the court of discretion in considering matters outside the
pleadings); 3M v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 87, 102 (D.D.C. 2012) (taking
notice of the heightened evidentiary standard in the anti-SLAPP statute
as opposed to summary judgment).
175. See 3M, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 96 (discussing the purpose and scope of Rule
12(d) as directly conflicting with anti-SLAPP laws); Intercon, 969 F.
Supp. 2d at 1043–45 (considering Rule 12(d) applies to anti-SLAPP cases
and preempts the state statute in question). See generally Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c), matters outside
the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion
must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.”). For
further discussion on Rule 12(d), see infra Part III.B.
176. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
177. See, e.g., Intercon, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (“Defendant’s Special Motion
to Strike asks this Court to evaluate hundreds of pages of material outside
of the pleadings, including declarations, affidavits, and exhibits.”). See
also statutes, supra notes 44–45, and accompanying text.
178. See Intercon, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1044; 3M, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 96.
179. Intercon, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1044, 1048; 3M, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 97.
180. See 3M, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 100 (“We think there is no justification for
dismissing a complaint for insufficiency of statement, except where it
appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief
under any state of facts which could be proved in support of the claim.”).
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always valid under the REA, the anti-SLAPP is preempted in federal
courts.181 While this is the minority view, it is the only result in district
courts that is consistent with the holding in Shady Grove.182

III. How to Determine Whether Anti-SLAPP
Statutes and Federal Rules Directly Collide
According to Shady Grove
For the purposes of REA analysis, the application of an antiSLAPP statute in federal court depends almost entirely on whether
there is a direct collision. Finding whether there is a direct collision
requires three steps. First, determine the procedural scope of the antiSLAPP statute in lieu of its procedural functions. Second, determine
the procedural scope of the federal rule. Finally, if the anti-SLAPP
motion limits the applicability of the federal rule, then they are in direct
conflict. There is the additional last step of REA analysis, whether the
rule really regulates procedure, but it is a forgone conclusion, since
every challenge to the validity of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
has been rejected.183 Thus, this Note only focuses on the three steps of
REA analysis outlined above for the purpose of determining whether
anti-SLAPP statutes apply in federal courts.
A.

The Scope of Anti-SLAPP Motions to Dismiss

Without a doubt, anti-SLAPP statutes protect important substantive rights. At the same time, they have very pronounced procedural mechanisms, which affect other important rights, as discussed
supra Part I.B. Applying the command of Shady Grove, courts should
181. See id. at 110–11 (discussing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56
under the REA); Intercon, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 150–53 (determining that
the fact that the federal rules are procedural controls).
182. See Intercon, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 (“Furthermore, not one of the
district court cases cited by Defendants looked to the history of Rule 12
or considered the Advisory Committee’s notes to the 1946 amendments
to determine whether, under Shady Grove, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure answer the question in dispute.”); 3M, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 107
(“Instead of first interpreting the scope and meaning of the federal rules,
as was done in Shady Grove and other cases, the First Circuit appears to
have found no conflict based on a side-by-side comparison of the federal
rules and the Maine statute.”). This is not to say that an analysis of Rule
12(d) under Shady Grove is the analysis that will result in the federal
rules preempting anti-SLAPP statutes in federal courts. Such was the case
in Stuborn Ltd. Partnership v. Bernstein, 245 F. Supp. 2d 312, 315–16
(D. Mass. 2003). There, the court determined that Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) preempted Massachusetts’s anti-SLAPP statute in
federal court by relying on Hanna.
183. See Shady Grove Orthopedics Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S.
Ct. 1431, 1442 (“Applying that test, we have rejected every statutory
challenge to a Federal Rule that has come before us.”).
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avoid an inquiry into the underlying purpose and substantive rights
protected by a state law. This means the scope of the anti-SLAPP
statute must be viewed for its procedural functions alone in order to
ascertain whether the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute is the same as
the scope of a federal rule.184 Those most pronounced procedural
functions of anti-SLAPP statutes have already been discussed:
expediting motions to dismiss frivolous claims;185 considering affidavits
and the pleadings for the purpose of deciding the motion;186 and staying
discovery.187 These are the functions most pertinent to determining
whether anti-SLAPP statutes overlap in scope with federal rules, and
subsequently, whether there is an impermissible conflict between the
two.
B.

Determining the Existence of a Direct Conflict Between the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Anti-SLAPP Statutes

Although, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have been a
recurring theme throughout this Note, they have yet to be given due
consideration. While this Note must address the most basic procedural
scope of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they will not be fully
discussed. At the very least, the scope of the three Rules that reappear
in cases deciding the applicability of anti-SLAPP statutes in federal
courts needs to be brought out in order to understand if they overlap
with anti-SLAPP statutes. Thus, this section discuss whether antiSLAPP laws impermissibly limit Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6), 56, and 12(d). The conclusion is that while anti-SLAPP
motions to dismiss do not likely conflict with Rule 12(b)(6), they almost
certainly directly collide with Rules 56 and 12(d).
Despite similarities between Rule 12(b)(6) and anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss, the two do not share an overlapping scope and so do
not conflict. While both function to dismiss frivolous claims, they do so
in very different ways. A Rule 12(b)(6) motion makes a very limited
inquiry, if any at all, into the merits of a claim.188 In fact, Rule 12(b)(6)
184. See supra notes 120–122, and accompanying text.
185. See statutes, supra note 37–38, and accompanying text.
186. See statutes, supra notes 44–45, and accompanying text.
187. See statutes, supra note 45, and accompanying text.
188. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) advisory committee’s note (“Some courts
have held that as the rule by its terms refers to statements in the
complaint, extraneous matter on affidavits, depositions or otherwise, may
not be introduced in support of the motion, or to resist it. On the other
hand, in many cases the district courts have permitted the introduction
of such material. . . . The Committee entertains the view that on motion
under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss for failure of the complaint to state a good
claim, the trial court should have authority to permit the introduction of
extraneous matter . . . .”). See also U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907–08
(9th Cir. 2003) (allowing the attachment of materials outside the
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does not function to “attack the merits of the case; it merely challenges
the pleader’s failure to state a claim properly.”189 Conversely, an antiSLAPP motion to dismiss inquires into the merits of the case in two
ways. First, courts must determine whether the defendant’s alleged act
of defamation was in “furtherance of a protected right.”190 Second, the
burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show a “reasonable probability of
prevailing on the merits of its claims.”191 Even if Rule 12(b)(6) is given
the maximum scope per Shady Grove, the function of weeding out
claims that are frivolous because of a failure to plead properly is wholly
different from an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss claims that are
frivolous by examining the merits supporting the pleadings. Therefore,
12(b)(6) motions and anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss are coextensive,
“each controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without
conflict.”192
Determining whether anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss directly conflict with summary judgment is more difficult. Much like anti-SLAPP
motions to dismiss, summary judgment is a tool for dismissing frivolous
claims.193 Unlike a motion under 12(b)(6), summary judgment inquires
into the merits underlying a claim based on material outside the
pleadings to discover whether there is a disputed issue of material fact
between the parties.194 In this way, summary judgment overlaps in
scope with anti-SLAPP statutes, which require the same sort of investigation into the merits based on evidence outside the pleadings.195 Still,
there is a difference between the two.

pleadings on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because the materials were
referred to in the pleadings).
189. Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice &
Procedure § 1366 (3d ed. 2004). In fact, Rule 12(b)(6) is “a procedural
vehicle for the resolution of purely legal disputes.” Brunet et al., supra
note 134, § 1.1. However, there has been debate over the degree of factual
pleading required in the complaint to make it immune from a 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss. Compare Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555–63 (2007) (requiring that the facts pleaded in the complaint need
to make the claim “plausible”) with Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (finding that a complaint must plead facts creating a “reasonable
inference”).
190. Litwiller, supra note 63, at 72.
191. Id.
192. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 752 (1979).
193. See Brunet et al., supra note 134, § 1.1 (observing that summary
judgment “holds center state” in dismissing frivolous claims before trial
in which “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact”).
194. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
195. See Litwiller, supra note 63, at 72.
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Where a motion for summary judgment looks to dismiss frivolous
cases generally,196 anti-SLAPP motions “apply only to suits challenging
the defendants’ exercise of their constitutional petitioning rights.”197
But the generality of summary judgment is what places the issues
governed by anti-SLAPP statutes in its scope. Shady Grove placed
particular emphasis on the general application for Rule 23 when
deducing its scope.198 The breadth of the federal rule does not exclude
its application in cases of a particular nature. To the contrary, because
the federal rule governs generally, the particularized scope of the state
law puts the state law’s scope in a subset of the general scope of the
federal rule.199 Therefore, because summary judgment applies generally,
it must also apply to specific cases where anti-SLAPP statutes protect
a defendant’s right to petition. The mistake of Godin, Newsham, and
the courts that followed them was assuming that the scope of antiSLAPP statutes are separate from the scope of the federal rules, since
an anti-SLAPP statute is only concerned with specific cases. Because
the specific cases governed by anti-SLAPP statutes are in a broader
category of cases covered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
two answer the same question.200
The overlap in scope is amplified because of how anti-SLAPP
motions to dismiss mirror the construction of summary judgment.201 Of
course, both the anti-SLAPP statute and summary judgment function
to dismiss actions, but the way they do so shows how they overlap.
Summary judgment dismisses not just on the pleadings, but on
“depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or
declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or
other materials.”202 Anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss also require a court
to look at up to hundreds of “affidavits” and similar documents.203 No
other Federal Rule of Civil Procedure dismisses a case before trial based
on the evidence supporting the factual basis of a claim; anti-SLAPP
motions mirror only Rule 56 in that regard. This indicates that the
framers of anti-SLAPP motions had summary judgment in mind when
196. See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 88 (2010) (noting that summary
judgment is a “general federal procedure[] governing all categories of
cases”).
197. Id.
198. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1438 (2010).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 1434.
201. Id. at 1439 (finding that Rule 23 and N.Y. C.P.L.R. 901(b) share the
same scope because language in 901(b) tracked the language of Rule 23).
202. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
203. See statutes, supra note 44, and accompanying text.
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crafting the scope.204 In fact, some anti-SLAPP motions require a court
to consider the motion as one for summary judgment, albeit subject to
less evidence and on an expedited basis. 205 This means that under Shady
Grove, the scope of an anti-SLAPP statute and summary judgment
overlap.
Because anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss and summary judgment
govern the same issues—the dismissal of frivolous claims—REA
analysis next asks whether the anti-SLAPP statute impermissibly limits
the use of summary judgment. Here, anti-SLAPP statutes do limit the
application of summary judgment. Claims that would otherwise be
subject to summary judgment are dismissed according to a burden of
persuasion, not production. Summary judgment makes an inquiry into
“whether a party possesses sufficient evidence to go to trial in the first
place”—a matter that “is concerned exclusively with the burden of
production.”206 Comparatively, anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss require
the defendant to make a “prima facie showing that the claim at issue
arises from an act in furtherance of the right of advocacy on issues of
public interest.”207 The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that
“the claim is likely to succeed on the merits.”208 This burden-shifting
process requires the litigant to convince the court of particular factual
assertions, which is a burden of persuasion.209 This means that claims
that would satisfy the burden of production but not of persuasion at
such an early stage of litigation are dismissed according to anti-SLAPP
statutes. These claims, given due consideration and evaluated according
to the burden of production under summary judgment, may have a
fighting chance, whereas they would not according to the burden of
persuasion under anti-SLAPP statutes. Furthermore, “a State cannot
limit [the criteria of a federal rule] by structuring one part of its statute
to track [the federal rule] and enacting another part which imposes
additional requirements.”210 Thus, the application of summary
judgment is limited by the heightened standard of proof, creating a
direct conflict.211
204. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438–42.
205. See, e.g., 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 110/10 (West 2003); Ind. Cod
Ann. § 34-7-7-9(a)(1) (West 2011); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 554.01(4) (West
2013); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 537.528(1) (2013).
206. Brunet et al., supra note 134, § 5.1.
207. E.g., D.C. Code § 16-5502(b) (2013).
208. Id.
209. Black’s Law Dictionary 223 (9th ed. 2009).
210. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1439 (2010).
211. The First Circuit addressed this issue and found that “it is long settled
that the allocation of proof is substantive in nature and controlled by
state law.” Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 89 (1st Cir. 2010). The First
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Finally, the collision between Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
anti-SLAPP statutes is most pronounced in Rule 12(d). It is notable
that this is perhaps the most under-discussed federal rule in cases
determining whether federal rules preempt anti-SLAPP statutes.212
Rule 12(d) is not a motion like a 12(b)(6) or summary judgment; it is
a conversion rule.213 When a movant makes a 12(b)(6) motion or a
similar motion214 and the court considers material outside the pleadings
for the purposes of that motion, Rule 12(d) converts that motion to
dismiss to a motion for summary judgment.215 Similarly, anti-SLAPP
statutes require courts to consider the pleadings, affidavits, and other
evidence external to the pleadings in determining whether to grant the
motion to dismiss.216 By giving the federal rule broad authority and
looking only at the procedural functions of anti-SLAPP statutes, one
can see that the two address exactly the same issue: what courts should
do when considering materials outside the pleadings on a motion to
dismiss.217 However, they address the issue in a way that brings them
into conflict.
Anti-SLAPP statutes impermissibly limit the application of Rule
12(d) by depriving the court of discretion and not converting the
motion into summary judgment. Rule 12(d) leaves the court discretion
whether to consider material extraneous to the pleadings in the first
Circuit relied on a Supreme Court case that dealt with the allocation of
the burden of proof in a case involving contributory negligence as an
affirmative defense, as opposed to the pleading standard in Rule 8(c). See
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943). The difference in antiSLAPP cases is that the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss does not just
allocate the burden between the parties, but raises the burden from
“production” to “persuasion,” which the Supreme Court has ruled is
impermissible. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002).
212. Not one of the circuit court opinions has addressed this issue. Of the
district courts that have addressed the issue in any detail, all have found
that anti-SLAPP statutes and Rule 12(d) directly conflict. See Intercon
Solutions, Inc. v. Basel Action Network, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1041–48
(N.D. Ill. 2013); 3M v. Boulter, 842 F. Supp. 2d 85, 101–04 (D.D.C. 2012).
213. Wright & Miller, supra note 189, § 1366.
214. See id. (“Although the conversion provision in Rule 12(b) expressly
applies only to the defense described in Rule 12(b)(6), it is not necessary
that the moving party actually label the motion as one under that provision in order for it to be converted into a motion for summary judgment.
The element that triggers the conversion is a challenge to the sufficiency
of the pleader’s claim supported by extra-pleading material. As many
cases recognize, it is not relevant how the defense actually is denominated
in the motion.”).
215. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).
216. See statutes, supra note 44, and accompanying text.
217. Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct.
1431, 1437 (2010).
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place.218 In stark contrast, anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss require the
court to consider such materials.219 In so doing, anti-SLAPP motions to
dismiss deprive the court of discretion whether to consider materials
extraneous to the pleadings on a motion to dismiss.220 This deprivation
of discretion is something that Shady Grove expressly prohibited.221
Furthermore, the anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss requires burden
shifting and heightened standards of proof in a way that does not
resemble summary judgment, as discussed above.222 This again brings
the anti-SLAPP statute into direct conflict with Rule 12(d) because
Rule 12(d) requires the motion to be converted to a motion for
summary judgment.223 Rule 12(d) does not permit “resolution of
disputes on the basis of affidavits and other pretrial data when there is
a material issue of fact that justifies a trial.”224 But that is exactly what
anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss do. This requires the court to place a
higher “procedural burden” on the plaintiff than would be required by
converting the motion under Rule 12(d).225 Effectively, this restricts the
plaintiff’s right to maintain an action under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and is a direct collision.226 Accordingly, the anti-SLAPP
statute cannot apply in federal court.

Conclusion
By tracking Shady Grove, giving breadth to the federal rules, and
looking at the anti-SLAPP statutes for the procedural effects alone, the
218. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c),
matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the
court . . . .”) (emphasis added). See also Intercon, 969 F. Supp. 2d at
1047 (“Rule 12(d) grants the trial court discretion in determining
whether . . . to accept materials outside of the pleadings.”).
219. See statutes, supra note 44, and accompanying text.
220. See Intercon, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.
221. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438 (finding that the New York law
limited the application of Rule 23 by requiring that certain conditions be
satisfied before bringing a class action suit, whereas “[t]he discretion
suggested by Rule 23’s ‘may’ is discretion residing in the plaintiff: He may
bring his claim in a class action if he wishes”). See also Burlington N.
R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 7 (1987) (“Thus, the Rule’s discretionary
mode of operation unmistakably conflicts with the mandatory provision
of [the state] statute.”).
222. See statutes, supra note 44, and accompanying text.
223. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) ([T]he motion must be treated as one for
summary judgment under Rule 56.”) (emphasis added).
224. Wright & Miller, supra note 189, § 1366.
225. Intercon, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1048.
226. See id.; Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1439 n.4.
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collision between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and anti-SLAPP
statutes is readily apparent. Since the second step of REA analysis,
whether the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is valid under the REA,
is a forgone conclusion,227 there is no need to discuss what would happen
with anti-SLAPP statutes under that part of the analysis. For that
reason, anti-SLAPP motions to dismiss cannot apply in federal court.
The plurality in Shady Grove gave sweeping authority to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the face of possibly conflicting state
laws. Essentially, the federal rules are given a textual interpretation,
and absent an act of Congress or language in the rule itself, state law
cannot limit the rule. The scope of the state statute is not given a
substantive interpretation but is read in terms of its procedural
functions only. This is why all the important substantive rights of antiSLAPP statutes are not supposed to be considered under REA analysis.
Further, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure protect important
procedural rights of litigants.228 The burden of proof placed on litigants
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and a litigant’s access to
materials through discovery to satisfy those burdens are rights that
cannot be displaced by a conflicting state law.
This does not leave substantive rights of anti-SLAPP motions to
dismiss with no chance in federal courts. According to Shady Grove, a
federal rule can be limited where Congress passes legislation to do so.229
The important rights protected under anti-SLAPP statutes would
undoubtedly apply in federal court if Congress enacted a federal antiSLAPP statute.230 Further discussion on that topic is not within the
purview of this Note, but unless Congress does pass such a law, antiSLAPP statutes should not apply in federal courts according to Shady
Grove.
Tyler J. Kimberly†

227. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1442 (“Applying that test, we have rejected
every statutory challenge to a Federal Rule that has come before us.”).
228. See Intercon, 969 F. Supp. 2d at 1048.
229. See Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1438–39 (reviewing specific exceptions to
Rule 23).
230. See Carson Hilary Barylak, Reducing Uncertainty in Anti-SLAPP
Protection, 71 Ohio St. L.J. 845, 853–54 (2010) (describing the benefits
of adopting a federal anti-SLAPP statute).
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